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Abstract 
This study constructs a novel dataset of bankruptcy filings for a large sample of non-US 
firms in 14 developed markets and sheds new light on the cross-sectional relation be-
tween default risk and stock returns. Using the reduced-form approach of Campbell et 
al. (2008) to estimate default probabilities, we offer conclusive evidence supporting the 
existence of a significant positive default risk premium in international markets. This 
finding is robust to different portfolio weighting schemes, data filters, risk-adjusting ap-
proaches and holding period definitions. Decomposing the default risk measure into its 
systematic and idiosyncratic components, we find that the former drives this positive re-
lation. We also show that the default risk premium is more pronounced in countries 
where creditor protection is stronger and shareholder bargaining power is lower. 
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The cross-sectional relation between default risk and stock returns, the so-called default risk 
premium, has been a subject of intense debate in the literature. Since the vast majority of de-
faults occur during recessions (Campbell et al., 2011; Moody’s, 2011), that is when investors’ 
marginal utility is high, standard asset pricing theory predicts that highly distressed stocks 
should yield higher premia relative to less distressed ones. However, most of the prior empiri-
cal studies for the US market report a flat, negative, or even hump-shaped relation between 
stock returns and several well-established proxies for default risk.1 Only few recent studies, 
using either relatively small samples or uncommon proxies for expected stock returns, have 
reported a significantly positive relation.2  The puzzling relation between default risk and 
stock returns is often called the "distress anomaly". 
In a recent insightful study, Gao et al. (2015, hereafter GPS) claim that the literature on 
the distress anomaly in the US market "[...] is currently characterized by disagreement, both 
about the basic finding and its interpretation" (p. 1). As a result, GPS argue that it is high time 
to shift the focus to new data for non-US firms. Using international data over the period 1992-
                                                          
1 Among the first studies to examine the pricing of default risk is Dichev (1998), who uses Altman’s (1968) 
Z-score and Ohlson’s (1980) O-score, showing that these measures are not positively related to stock re-
turns. Similarly, Griffin and Lemmon (2002) use the O-score to show that, after controlling for the book-to-
market ratio, there is no evidence that default risk is priced. More recently, George and Hwang (2010) re-
port a negative relation between stock returns and default risk measured by the O-score after excluding 
stocks trading at low prices. Departing from the use of accounting models, Vassalou and Xing (2004) ex-
tract default risk estimates from the Merton (1974) model and find that a positive return differential exists 
between stocks with high and low exposures to their default risk measure, but this return differential is sig-
nificant only for small value firms. Moreover, Da and Gao (2010) show that the premium reported in Vas-
salou and Xing (2004) is mainly driven by a short-term return reversal effect, and disappears when allow-
ing for a one-month gap between portfolio formation and the beginning of the holding period. Using mar-
ket-based default probability estimates from the proprietary model of Moody’s KMV, Garlappi et al. 
(2008) and Garlappi and Yan (2011) find a hump-shaped relation between default risk and stock returns, 
whereas Anginer and Yildizhan (2014) obtain a flat relation between corporate credit spreads and risk-
adjusted returns. Avramov et al. (2009) show that stock returns significantly increase with S&P senior debt 
credit ratings, implying a negative relation between returns and default risk. The most comprehensive evi-
dence comes from Campbell et al. (2008), who measure default risk using a dynamic hazard model. They 
document a strongly negative relation between default risk and stock returns, which becomes even more 
significant after accounting for size, value, and momentum premia.  
2 Chava and Purnanandam (2010) show that expected stock returns implied from accounting valuation 
models increase with a broad set of default risk measures. Friewald et al. (2014), using a recent but rather 




2013, they find a negative relation between stock returns and Moody’s KMV Expected De-
fault Frequency (EDF), which becomes more pronounced among small capitalization stocks. 
GPS fail to find a relation between the default risk premium and creditor protection at the 
country level, which contradicts the empirical evidence of Garlappi et al. (2008), Garlappi and 
Yan (2011), and Favara et al. (2012). In contrast, they claim that country-level individualism, 
which serves as a proxy for investor overconfidence, is significantly negatively related to the 
default risk premium. Similarly, Eisdorfer et al. (2013, hereafter EGZ) use a default risk 
proxy derived from the Merton (1974) model (hereafter MDD) to examine the pricing of de-
fault risk in an international sample over the period 1992-2010. They find a significant nega-
tive MDD-stock return relation, which originates from the developed countries in their da-
taset. 
In the spirit of EGZ and GPS, we also use international data to shed more light on the dis-
tress anomaly. However, we do not use a structural model estimate of default risk. Instead, we 
collect firm bankruptcy filings for 14 developed countries, excluding the US, over the period 
1992-2013, and we estimate default probabilities following the reduced-form approach of 
Campbell et al. (2008, hereafter CHS). Whereas we examine a smaller set of countries than 
the other two studies, we benefit from the use of a more flexible and better-calibrated default 
risk proxy.3 In particular, our CHS measure incorporates more efficiently cross-country varia-
tions with respect to average default rates and the importance of the various default risk indi-
cators; these variations arise from differences in the bankruptcy filing process and are induced 
by the local bankruptcy laws and institutional settings. Consistent with this conjecture, we 
show that the parameter estimates of our bankruptcy forecasting model vary significantly 
across countries. 
                                                          
3 Our dataset features 2.03 million firm-month observations from 14 countries (excluding the US) during 
the period 1992-2013, in comparison to 4.3 million observations from 38 countries (including the US) in 
GPS. Despite the lower number of observations, our dataset includes many countries that exhibit relatively 
low correlations with the US, rendering it suitable for an out-of-sample study (see Foster et al., 1997). 
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Importantly, in-sample and out-of-sample tests show that the reduced-form approach that 
we follow in this study exhibits a clearly superior bankruptcy forecasting ability relative to 
MDD. Adding the CHS default risk indicators to MDD almost doubles the explanatory power 
of the bankruptcy forecasting LOGIT model in most cases. On the other hand, adding MDD 
to the CHS default risk indicators typically has a negligible contribution to the model’s ex-
planatory power. The CHS measure is also more successful than MDD in classifying as high 
default risk the firms that subsequently file for bankruptcy. Interestingly, 40% of all firms that 
filed for bankruptcy in our sample were ex ante classified into the 5th highest default risk per-
centile according to CHS, whereas the corresponding portion of bankruptcies classified into 
the 5th highest percentile according to MDD is only 30.8%. These results confirm, for the first 
time in an international setup, the superiority of the reduced-form approach reported for US 
firms by Campbell et al. (2008), and echo the conclusion of Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
that MDD is not a sufficient statistic for bankruptcy forecasting.4   
Our asset pricing results are notably different from those in EGZ and GPS. We estimate 
country-specific LOGIT models to compute out-of-sample (OOS) default probabilities for 
firms in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the UK (hereafter, the C6 countries) 
over the sample period 2000-2014. Taking the perspective of an international investor, we use 
the entire cross-section of these estimated default probabilities to sort stocks into international 
portfolios and to compute their post-ranking returns. We find an economically and statistical-
ly significant positive relation between default risk and stock returns. In particular, the spread 
strategy that is long the highest default risk quintile portfolio and short the lowest one yields 
an average return of 13.86% p.a. (t-stat: 2.71) in the case of value-weighted portfolios and 
10.24% p.a. (t-stat: 2.43) in the case of equally-weighted portfolios. Next, we estimate bank-
ruptcy regime-specific LOGIT models to compute OOS default probabilities for firms in 
                                                          
4 Bharath and Shumway (2008) and Campbell et al. (2008) show that hazard model estimates are superior 
in forecasting US firm defaults as compared to structural estimates obtained from the Merton (1974) model 
(MDD) and calculated using either the Hillegeist et al. (2004) or the Vassalou and Xing (2004) methodolo-
gy. We are unaware of any prior study testing the forecasting ability of CHS and MDD for non-US firms. 
4 
 
countries with too few bankruptcies to estimate country-specific LOGIT models (Denmark, 
Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Taiwan). Using the OOS 
default probabilities from these eight countries together with the ones from the C6 countries 
(hereafter, the C14 countries), we obtain very similar conclusions.5 
Adjusting for market risk does not materially affect these findings. However, adjusting 
for size and value premia, the magnitude of the default risk premium is reduced in the case of 
value-weighted portfolio returns, suggesting that, in line with the conjectures of Chan and 
Chen (1991) and Fama and French (1996), and the evidence in Vassalou and Xing (2004), the 
latter factors are related to default risk. Nevertheless, the default risk premium remains signif-
icant. Moreover, in line with the arguments of Kapadia (2011), the returns of the market, size, 
and value factors are negatively correlated with contemporaneous innovations in aggregate 
default risk, whereas the market and size factor returns also contain predictive ability with re-
spect to future changes in firms’ failure rates. 
Why do our results differ from those in EGZ and GPS?6 To address this question, we 
compare our CHS estimates with the corresponding MDD estimates. MDD is thought to be a 
close proxy for EDF (Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Correia et al., 2012). Also, in contrast to 
EDF, which is proprietary, MDD is replicable for our international sample. Equipped with 
CHS and MDD, we repeat the portfolio formation exercises using each of the two measures as 
                                                          
5 For comparison, we also examine the CHS default risk-stock return relation in the US market during our 
sample period. To this end, we combine the OOS LOGIT model estimates obtained by Campbell et al. 
(2008) with the LOGIT model’s predictor variables constructed from CRSP and COMPUSTAT data fol-
lowing exactly the same procedures as they do. Consistent with their remark that "the outperformance of 
the portfolio that is long safe stocks and short distressed stocks is concentrated in periods such as the late 
1980s" (p. 2928), and the evidence provided in O’Doherty (2012), the asset pricing tests presented in the 
Supplementary Appendix show that the default risk-stock return relation has become insignificant post-
2000. Nevertheless, we still fail to find the theoretically expected positive relation. Thus, the different con-
clusions that we derive from our international sample relative to the puzzling evidence documented in the 
literature for US firms are not solely driven by the fact that we consider a more recent sample period. We 
are grateful to Jens Hilscher for providing their OOS LOGIT model estimates. 
6 In particular, GPS find that, outside the US market, an equally-weighted spread strategy, which is long 
low default risk stocks and short high default risk stocks, yields an abnormal performance of around 30 ba-
sis points per month. This abnormal performance becomes stronger among small capitalization firms. 
Moreover, EGZ find that, in developed markets, value-weighted portfolios of stocks in the most distressed 
quintile underperform the corresponding portfolios of stocks in the least distressed quintile by an average of 
17 to 63 basis points per month.  
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alternative sorting criteria only for those firm-month observations for which both measures 
are available. Whereas CHS still yields a positive default risk premium, MDD yields a U-
shape relation. In particular, for the C6 countries, the spread strategy Q5-Q1 that is long the 
highest MDD quintile portfolio (Q5) and short the lowest one (Q1) yields an insignificant 
value-weighted (equally-weighted) premium of 1.21% (-0.86%) p.a.. 
Examining the source of discrepancy between CHS and MDD, we find that these two 
measures considerably disagree on the identification of low default risk firms. In particular, 
out-of-sample bankruptcy forecasting tests show that CHS is also superior to MDD in identi-
fying low default risk firms. Computing the frequency of actual bankruptcies across portfolios 
constructed on the basis of each of these two measures, we find that the proportion of filings 
by firms classified into the lowest MDD default risk quintile is twice as high as the corre-
sponding proportion of firms classified into the lowest CHS quintile. 
This disagreement is driven by unlevered firms as well as default-triggering events ig-
nored by MDD, but not by CHS. Whereas MDD assigns zero default risk to unlevered firms 
because it assumes that default occurs only if the asset value drops below a fraction of the 
debt value (see Crosbie and Bohn, 2003; Vassalou and Xing, 2004), CHS assigns a higher de-
fault risk to such firms. Moreover, Davydenko (2008) shows that whereas most defaulting 
firms are insolvent and illiquid, a fraction of them are only illiquid. Similar to the MDD proxy 
used by EGZ, the EDF proxy used by GPS also abstracts from bankruptcies triggered by li-
quidity issues, whereas the CHS proxy takes them into account. 
In further analysis, we examine what drives the documented positive default risk premi-
um. To this end, we construct double-sorted portfolios on CHS and a series of country-level 
characteristics. Overall, the premium is found to be relatively higher in countries where credi-
tor protection is higher and shareholder bargaining power is lower, in line with the arguments 
of Favara et al. (2012). Moreover, consistent with the shareholder advantage hypothesis of 
Garlappi et al. (2008) and Garlappi and Yan (2011), we find that the default risk premium is 
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more pronounced among firms with high asset tangibility.7 To the contrary, we do not find 
any evidence that the default risk premium is driven by investor overconfidence, stock market 
liquidity conditions or the quality of accounting standards at the country level. 
 Finally, following Anginer and Yildizhan (2014), we decompose the CHS default risk 
measure into its systematic and idiosyncratic components. Consistent with the arguments of 
Anginer and Yildizhan (2014), Friewald et al. (2014), and Hilscher and Wilson (2015), we 
find that it is the systematic component of firm default risk that drives the positive relation be-
tween default risk and stock premia. On the other hand, the idiosyncratic component of de-
fault risk yields an insignificant relation. 
 
2. Data 
2.1 Bankruptcy Data 
Our sources for the bankruptcy filing data are provided in the Supplementary Appendix. 
These sources include commercial data providers, government institutions, stock exchanges, 
and other researchers. In a number of cases, we have merged data from more than one source 
to extend the length of the sample period. For most countries, the data cover the period from 
January 1996 to December 2013, although for France, Japan, and the UK they begin slightly 
earlier (1992-1993). The data contain, at the very least, the identity of the filing firm and the 
filing date. The dataset includes filings under any legal procedure, except where noted. Since 
we often lack information on how long firms spent in re-organization, we drop firms after 
their initial bankruptcy filing in our sample period. 
                                                          
7 Garlappi et al. (2008) and Garlappi and Yan (2011) show that, if shareholders possess high bargaining 
power relative to creditors, then the former can strategically default to extract rents from the latter. Dis-
tressed firms in which shareholder bargaining power is high are less risky for shareholders, and hence they 
do not yield a premium. This argument is reinforced by the evidence of Hackbarth et al. (2015), who use 
the 1978 US Bankruptcy Reform Act as a natural experiment of shifting bargaining power towards share-
holders. Along the same lines, Favara et al. (2012) show that equity risk is lower in countries with bank-
ruptcy procedures that favor debt renegotiations and with low creditor recovery rate. 
7 
 
 Table 1 reports the number of bankruptcy filings, the number of firms with complete 
data, and the proportion of bankruptcy filings per country and year. To save space, filings and 
descriptive statistics are reported only for the C6 countries. This is the most comprehensive 
bankruptcy dataset for non-US firms that has been examined in the literature, containing 944 
bankruptcies across 14 developed markets. Table 1 shows that the frequency of bankruptcy 
filings considerably varies across countries. Filings are more frequent in countries where the 
bankruptcy system strongly favors managers or creditors (Germany and the UK) relative to 
countries where employee welfare is more important (France and Japan). In addition, bank-
ruptcy filings are strongly correlated through time, reaching a peak in the aftermath of the 
2007-2008 global financial crisis. 
[Table 1 here] 
Since we require a sufficient number of filings for model estimation and calculation of 
default probabilities, we recursively estimate our LOGIT models starting from December 
1999; hence we perform our OOS asset pricing tests for the period 2000-2014. This choice 
ensures that there are at least five bankruptcy filings for each country for which we separately 
run LOGIT models (i.e., the C6 countries) before the start of the test period. 
 
2.2  Default Risk Indicators 
We use the same default risk indicators as in Campbell et al. (2008) to estimate default proba-
bilities. The first variable is the ratio of net income to a market value-adjusted version of total 
assets (NIMTA), where the latter is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value 
of total liabilities. Similar to Campbell et al. (2008), we use the market, instead of the book 
value of equity in the denominator of NIMTA, because the former captures firms’ prospects 
more accurately. Leverage is measured using the ratio of total liabilities to the market value-
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adjusted version of total assets (TLMTA).8 Since lack of liquidity can also force a firm to file 
for bankruptcy (Davydenko, 2008), we proxy internal cash by the ratio of cash holdings plus 
short-term assets to the market value-adjusted version of total assets (CASHMTA). Moreover, 
we use the market-to-book ratio (MB) to measure growth opportunities.9 
We also utilize market-based default risk indicators, such as the firm’s monthly log stock 
return in excess of the index return of the market in which the firm is headquartered 
(EXRET), and the annualized standard deviation of the firm’s daily log stock returns over the 
prior three months (SIGMA), estimated by: 








,   (1) 
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑘 is the log stock return of firm 𝑖 on day 𝑘, and 𝑁 is the number of trading days in the 
3-month estimation interval 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴 is set to missing if there are fewer than five non-zero dai-
ly returns. However, to avoid excluding illiquid stocks from our sample, we replace missing 
values for 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴 with the corresponding country-month cross-sectional mean. We further 
use relative market size (RSIZE), defined as the log ratio of the firm’s market value to the to-
tal market value of firms in the same country-month. Finally, following Campbell et al. 
(2008), we also use log share price (PRICE) as a default risk indicator to capture the inability 
of distressed firms to engage in reverse stock splits, implying that such firms often trade at 
low share prices. 
In the remainder, we collectively refer to NIMTA, TLMTA, EXRET, RSIZE, SIGMA, 
CASHMTA, MB, and PRICE as the CHS default risk indicators. Whereas NIMTA, TLMTA, 
RSIZE, and MB are currency-free, EXRET, SIGMA, and PRICE are measured in local cur-
                                                          
8 We have also experimented with versions of NIMTA and TLMTA scaled by the book value of total assets 
rather than its market-value adjusted counterpart. Similar to Campbell et al. (2008), we have found that us-
ing the book value of total assets decreases the ability of NIMTA and TLMTA to forecast bankruptcy. 
9 To make sure that book values of equity that are close to zero do not yield extreme values when used in 
the denominator of MB, we follow Cohen et al. (2003) in adding 10% of the difference between the market 
and the book value of equity to the latter. In the few cases where this adjustment does not generate a posi-




rency. To alleviate the effect of outliers, we winsorize the default risk indicators at the 5th and 
95th percentiles, computed for each country-month distribution separately. The only exception 
is PRICE, which is winsorized at the 25th and 75th percentiles.  
Market data are sourced from Thomson Datastream at daily and monthly frequencies. We 
consider only shares traded in local currency and exclude non-primary issues. Accounting da-
ta are sourced from Worldscope at an annual frequency because quarterly data are unavailable 
for most non-US firms before 2000. Where necessary, we convert the accounting items into 
the currency of the issue using the Thomson Datastream conversion factors. As the reporting 
gap can be substantially longer in international markets than in the US (DeFond et al., 2007), 
we assume that the accounting items are available to investors six months after the fiscal year 
end. To avoid dropping firms shortly before their filing date, we further assume that investors 
use outdated data for up to twelve months if more recent data are unavailable. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the default risk indicators of active and bankrupt 
firms. The default risk indicators of the bankrupt firms are measured in the month prior to 
their filing (t-1). The table suggests that firms filing for bankruptcy are in general less profita-
ble (NIMTA), more levered (TLMTA), and more volatile (SIGMA) than non-bankrupt firms. 
They also tend to have lower stock returns (EXRET), market-to-book ratios (MB), and log 
stock prices (PRICE) relative to non-filing firms. However, deviating from Campbell et al. 
(2008), filing firms do not hold considerably less cash (CASHMTA) on average. 
[Table 2 here] 
A more detailed inspection of Table 2 reveals notable differences between filing and non-
filing firms across countries. For example, firms filing for bankruptcy in Japan are only slight-
ly less profitable relative to non-bankrupt firms. In particular, the difference in their average 
NIMTA is only -0.03, whereas it is much larger in the other countries, with the exception of 
France where the difference is also relatively small (-0.08). Moreover, German firms do not 
use up their internal slack to delay bankruptcy filings, and hence they typically enter bank-
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ruptcy with more cash holdings (mean=0.16) than filing firms in the other countries of our 
sample. 
An explanation for these features could be that both France and Germany have “stop-
early” bankruptcy regimes. In France, managers are obliged to file for bankruptcy within 45 
days, once the value of their liquid assets drops below that of their short-term liabilities. In 
fact, it is the French court that ultimately decides whether a bankrupt firm should be restruc-
tured, and its main objectives are to keep the firm alive, to preserve employment, and to satis-
fy creditors (Kaiser, 1996). In Germany, managers are also obliged to file within three weeks 
if firm net worth drops below a specific threshold. Failure to do so can render managers per-
sonally liable to creditors (Wood, 2007). 
Whereas there are no similar obligations in Japan, it is possible that Japanese banks are 
able to use their dominant position to force managers to file early, while the bank’s claims are 
still relatively secure (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2001). This feature may also explain why 
the stock returns of Japanese firms prior to filing are, on average, the least negative relative to 
filing firms in the other countries. 
Overall, the univariate analysis in Table 2 highlights important cross-country variations 
in the ability of the default risk indicators to distinguish between bankrupt and non-bankrupt 
firms. These variations can often be linked to differences in bankruptcy codes or institutional 
features across countries. This evidence motivates the estimation of country-specific LOGIT 
models to compute default probabilities, as described in Section 3. 
  
2.3 Market, Size, Value, and Momentum Factors 
Our asset pricing tests adjust portfolio returns for their market, size, value, and momentum 
factor exposures, using the CAPM, the Fama-French (FF) 3-factor model, and the Fama-
French-Carhart (FFC) 4-factor model, respectively. To this end, we use the Developed Mar-
kets Global ex US Fama-French market, size, value, and momentum factors, which are avail-
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able from Kenneth French’s online data library; 10 see Fama and French (2012, p. 459-460), 
for their construction details. Interestingly, the set of developed markets that are used to con-
struct the above factors has a very large degree of overlap with the C14 countries that we use 
in our study, rendering these factors appropriate for risk-adjusting our portfolio returns.11 
 We have additionally used two alternative sets of factors to risk-adjust portfolio re-
turns. First, we have computed our own market, size, value, and momentum factor returns us-
ing the same universe of stocks as the one used to construct portfolios for the C6 and C14 
countries, respectively. Second, we have computed market, size, and value factor returns us-
ing the returns on the relevant MSCI World ex US Indices. The Supplementary Appendix dis-
cusses the construction of these factors and reports the corresponding asset pricing results. In 
sum, the magnitude and significance of the international default risk premium that we report 
in the benchmark results remain robust to the use of the alternative sets of factors. 
 
3. Forecasting Bankruptcies Around the World 
3.1 The Bankruptcy Forecasting Model 
Following Campbell et al. (2008, 2011), we use a reduced-form hazard model to construct our 
default risk measure (see also Shumway, 2001; Chava and Jarrow, 2004; Hillegeist et al., 
2004; O’Doherty, 2012). This hazard model specifies the probability of bankruptcy 12 months 
ahead conditional on survival in the interim 11 months as: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑚−12(𝑌𝑖,𝑚 = 1| 𝑌𝑖,𝑚−1 = 0) =
1
1 + exp (−𝛼 − 𝜷′𝑿𝑖,𝑚−12)
, 
(2) 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑚 is a dummy variable that equals one if firm 𝑖 files for bankruptcy in month 𝑚 and 
zero otherwise, and 𝑿𝒊,𝒎−𝟏𝟐 is a vector containing the publicly available values (i.e., allowing 
for a reporting gap for the accounting items) of the default risk indicators for firm 𝑖 in month 
                                                          
10 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Developed. 




𝑚 − 12. We term the default probability estimated from the above hazard model as the CHS 
default risk measure. The standard LOGIT specification in (2) implies that this default risk 
measure is a non-linear transformation of the firm characteristics that are used to compute it. 
We firstly estimate the LOGIT model in (2) for each of the C6 countries. For the remain-
ing eight countries that feature too few (less than 40) bankruptcies to be analyzed separately, 
we pool the data by bankruptcy law regime and estimate the corresponding regime-specific 
LOGIT model. Following Wood (2007), we assign Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, New Zea-
land, and the UK to the common law regime; France, Spain, and Portugal to the Napoleonic 
regime; Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Sweden to the Roman-Germanic regime; and Tai-
wan and Japan to the mixed regime. 
The estimation of country- and bankruptcy regime-specific LOGIT models provides an 
important source of flexibility relative to estimating a single (global) LOGIT model. In par-
ticular, this approach allows us to capture cross-country variations with respect to average de-
fault rates (through the constant term) as well as the contribution of the various default risk 
indicators (through the coefficients in 𝜷). This is an important feature since we subsequently 
use these estimated default probabilities to sort the entire cross-section of stocks into interna-
tional portfolios.  
Whereas in-sample default probability estimates are informative, they are obviously not 
available to investors in real time, and hence they would induce a look-ahead bias in our asset 
pricing tests. Therefore, our asset pricing tests make use of out-of-sample (OOS) default 
probabilities that are based on recursive estimations of model (2). Determining the initial es-
timation window, we face the following dilemma. On the one hand, OOS default probabilities 
should be estimated using sufficiently long windows to ensure that the default risk proxy is 
precisely estimated. On the other hand, asset pricing tests should be conducted over suffi-
ciently long time periods to derive meaningful results. We opt for an initial estimation win-
dow using data up to December 1999. This choice ensures that each window includes at least 
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five bankruptcy filings for each country, and allows us to perform asset pricing tests using 15 
years of monthly returns. 
Having estimated each LOGIT model using data until December of year 𝑡 − 1, we com-
bine the recursively estimated coefficients with the corresponding publicly available values 
for the default risk indicators in December of year 𝑡 − 1 to compute OOS default probabilities 
for each firm and each month in the following year 𝑡, as in Campbell et al. (2008). 
We compare CHS with a popular default risk proxy, Merton’s (1974) Distance-to-Default 











where 𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the implied asset value, 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 is the estimated asset volatility, 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 is the mean return 
of the implied asset value series, and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is the default-triggering asset value. To compute 
MDD, we require the market value of equity, the default-triggering asset value, and the risk-
free rate. Following Crosbie and Bohn (2003) and Vassalou and Xing (2004), we set the de-
fault-triggering asset value equal to the book value of short-term debt plus one-half of the 
book value of long-term debt. We use the local 3-month interest rate as a proxy for the risk-
free rate of return. 
 We follow Vassalou and Xing (2004) in computing MDD. In particular, we use as ini-
tial guess of the firm’s asset volatility its stock return volatility, calculated from daily data 
over the prior twelve months. Using this initial guess together with the market value of equity, 
the default-triggering asset value, and the risk-free rate, we derive the firm’s asset value from 
the Black and Scholes (1973) call option formula on each trading day over the prior twelve 
months. The time-series of asset values allow us to derive a new estimate of the firm’s asset 
volatility. We iterate this process until the asset volatility estimate converges. Plugging the as-
set volatility estimate and the other variables into (3), we obtain MDD. By construction, 
MDD is available OOS. As with CHS, MDD also captures default risk twelve months ahead. 
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Computing MDD from (3), the corresponding implied default probability is given by: 
                                                            𝜋𝑀𝐷𝐷,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝒩(−𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡),                          (4) 
where 𝒩(∙) is the normal cumulative density function. Throughout the remainder, we term 
the MDD-implied default probability as the MDD default risk proxy.12 
  
3.2 Estimates of the In-Sample LOGIT Models 
Table 3 reports the full sample estimates of the LOGIT model in (2) for each of the C6 coun-
tries. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the results for the bankruptcy law regimes, but 
these are available upon request. In general, the reported results confirm the univariate analy-
sis from the descriptive statistics in Table 2. In particular, the default probability tends to in-
crease with total liabilities (TLMTA) and stock return volatility (SIGMA), whereas it tends to 
decrease with profitability (NIMTA), excess returns (EXRET), relative size (RSIZE), and 
cash holdings (CASHMTA). Based on their significance levels, TLMTA, RSIZE, and SIG-
MA are the most important default risk indicators. The log stock price (PRICE) is related to 
the default probability with an ambiguous sign, whereas MB is insignificant in most cases. 
[Table 3 here] 
Using the same LOGIT model to forecast US failures, Campbell et al. (2008) report a 
pseudo-R2 of 11.4% for a 12-month forecasting horizon. Noting that we do not consider per-
formance-related delistings, and that our sample period is shorter, the pseudo-R2s in Table 3 
suggest that this LOGIT model also exhibits good forecasting power for the countries we ex-
amine, which is particularly high in France (9.4%), Canada (9.2%) and Japan (8.3%). 
The results reported in Table 3 also suggest that there are notable variations in the esti-
mated coefficients of the default risk indicators across countries. These variations are often, 
                                                          
12 In the Supplementary Appendix, we alternatively compute MDD using two other proxies for the ex-
pected return of firms’ assets, and we re-examine the performance of the MDD-sorted portfolios. Using ei-
ther of these two alternative proxies, the corresponding MDD-based asset pricing results are very similar to 
the ones derived using the benchmark approach that is presented here.  
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albeit not always, consistent with the patterns revealed by the descriptive statistics in Table 2. 
For example, CASHMTA is insignificant in Germany and NIMTA is insignificant in Japan. 
To test whether cross-country variations in the estimated coefficient of a default risk indicator 
are statistically significant, we pool all countries’ data and estimate a single LOGIT model 
with a complete set of country interaction terms (unrestricted model). We then take turns in 
dropping the country interaction terms associated with each default risk indicator (restricted 
model), re-estimate the model, and compute the corresponding likelihood ratio (LR) test. The 
last column in Table 3 reports these LR statistics, suggesting the rejection of the null hypothe-
sis of no cross-country variations for all default risk indicators, except for EXRET. 
 
3.3 Bankruptcy Forecasting Ability Comparison between CHS and MDD 
Advocating the use of CHS as a default risk proxy for our international sample, we compare 
its bankruptcy forecasting ability with the one of MDD. To this end, we perform both in-
sample and out-of-sample tests, similar to the ones performed by Campbell et al. (2008) and 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) for the US market.  
With respect to in-sample tests, Table 4 presents the results from country-specific LOGIT 
models that include either only MDD (Panel A), or MDD together with the CHS default risk 
indicators (Panel B), or only the CHS default risk indicators (Panel C). These models are es-
timated using only firm-month observations for which both MDD and the CHS default risk 
indicators are available. Panel A suggests that, on its own, MDD is a significant predictor of 
bankruptcy, and its coefficient carries the correct sign. However, the results reported in Panel 
B show that adding the CHS default risk indicators to the model substantially decreases the 
magnitude of the MDD coefficient, which now becomes insignificant in 3 out of 6 countries. 
Equally importantly, comparing pseudo-R2s between Panels A and B, we find that adding the 
CHS default risk indicators to MDD doubles the bankruptcy forecasting power of the LOGIT 
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models across all countries, with the exception of Germany where the increase is still notable 
but not that high. 
[Table 4 here] 
Another way to confirm the in-sample superiority of the CHS default risk indicators is to 
compare how the LOGIT models’ pseudo-R2s change when we add MDD on top of these in-
dicators. Comparing the pseudo-R2s in Panel C with the ones in Panel B, it becomes apparent 
that MDD has a negligible contribution to the models’ explanatory power, again with the ex-
ception of Germany. In sum, the CHS default risk indicators subsume the bankruptcy-relevant 
information contained in MDD. These results closely resemble the ones reported in Campbell 
et al. (2008) for the US market, confirming the in-sample superiority of these default risk in-
dicators relative to MDD in our international setup. Moreover, these results echo the conclu-
sion of Bharath and Shumway (2008) that MDD is not a sufficient statistic for default risk. 
 To assess the out-of-sample bankruptcy forecasting ability of these two default risk 
measures, we compute their corresponding accuracy ratios following the approach of Vas-
salou and Xing (2004, p. 842-843). In particular, for each of these two measures we rank 
firms in descending order according to their default probabilities estimated in December of 
year 𝑡 − 1 and then compute the corresponding areas under curve using the actual defaults 
that occurred in year 𝑡. The area under curve reflects the portion of firms that actually default-
ed within a given percentage of firms with the highest default risk. The accuracy ratio is given 
by the ratio of each measure’s area under curve divided by the area under curve of the "per-
fect foresight measure", which could ex ante assign the highest rank exactly to those firms 
that subsequently defaulted. The accuracy ratio of the perfect default risk measure would be 
equal to 1, whereas the accuracy ratio of a zero-information measure would be equal to 0. 
 We compute the accuracy ratios for each of the two default risk measures in each year 
of our sample. For the C6 (C14) countries, CHS yields an average accuracy ratio of 0.667 
(0.668), whereas the corresponding figure for MDD is 0.595 (0.591). Interestingly, CHS also 
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yields a higher average accuracy ratio for each of the C6 countries (see Panel D of Table 4). 
These results confirm the ability of CHS to predict out-of-sample corporate defaults in our in-
ternational sample, both in absolute and in relative terms. 
 To further assess the out-of-sample bankruptcy forecasting ability of these two default 
risk measures, we have also performed a portfolio-based analysis, which is presented in the 
Supplementary Appendix. In sum, we find that CHS exhibits a superior ability to ex ante clas-
sify as extremely high default risk a notably higher portion of firms that subsequently filed for 
bankruptcy. 
 
4. The International Default Risk Premium 
4.1 Default Risk and Stock Returns in the C6 and C14 Countries 
In this section, we examine the performance of international default risk-sorted portfolios. In 
our benchmark tests, we use monthly portfolio returns that are calculated from the perspective 
of an international investor and are expressed in US dollar (USD) terms. Similarly, excess 
portfolio returns are computed in excess of the USD risk-free rate. In particular, we sort the 
entire cross-section of stocks in ascending order on the basis of their CHS estimates in De-
cember of each year 𝑡 − 1  and assign them to international quantile portfolios. For our 
benchmark analysis, we follow the practice of Da and Gao (2010) and calculate portfolio re-
turns from February of year 𝑡 to January of year 𝑡 + 1; that is, we allow for a one-month gap 
between portfolio formation and the beginning of the 12-month holding period to alleviate 
concerns that portfolio performance is driven by a short-term return reversal effect. 
Since non-US stock return data can be of lower quality, we impose several data filters. In 
particular, our main results exclude a stock in year 𝑡 if its market capitalization or its price in 
December of year 𝑡 − 1 is lower than the 5th percentile of the corresponding country-month 
distribution. Using these filters, we alleviate concerns that the performance of high default 
risk portfolios is driven by microcap stocks or microstructure biases. We calculate both value-
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weighted (vw) and equally-weighted (ew) portfolio returns. We report average excess portfo-
lio returns as well as portfolio alphas adjusted for market risk (CAPM alphas) or, alternative-
ly, for market, size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (MOM) factor exposures according 
to the FFC model (FFC alphas). Reported returns and alphas are annualized. 
In Table 5, we report the premia of several quantile portfolios constructed on the basis of 
OOS CHS estimates for the C6 (Panel A) and C14 countries (Panel B) during the period 
2000-2014. To measure the default risk premium, we calculate the return of a spread strategy 
that is long the quintile portfolio with the highest default risk stocks (Q5) and short the quin-
tile portfolio with the lowest default risk stocks (Q1). Finally, we also calculate the corre-
sponding return of a spread strategy that is long the decile portfolio with the highest default 
risk stocks (P10) and short the decile portfolio with the lowest default risk stocks (P1). 
[Table 5 here] 
The results in Table 5 show that average premia and CAPM alphas increase almost mon-
otonically as we move from low to high default risk portfolios across both the C6 and the C14 
countries. In the case of value-weighted portfolios, the average return of the spread strategy 
Q5-Q1 is equal to 13.86% p.a. in the C6 and 13.42% p.a. in the C14 countries, indicating the 
existence of an economically significant default risk premium. The premium is also highly 
statistically significant (C6 countries t-stat: 2.71, C14 countries t-stat: 3.03).13 Moreover, the 
premium is of similar magnitude when we use equally-weighted portfolio returns: 10.24% 
p.a. (t-stat: 2.43) in the C6 and 9.99% p.a. (t-stat: 2.66) in the C14 countries. 
Adjusting for market risk, the magnitude and the significance of the premium are not af-
fected. This result originates from the fact that the average excess market return over the ex-
amined sample period has been quite low (3.83% p.a.), so potentially different market expo-
sures cannot explain the default risk premium. In particular, in the C14 countries, the spread 
                                                          
13 Newey-West (1987) standard errors are used for the calculation of the reported t-statistics. 
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strategy Q5-Q1 yields a CAPM alpha of 12.26% p.a. (t-stat: 2.83) in the case of value-
weighted portfolios and 8.86% p.a. (t-stat: 2.88) in the case of equally-weighted portfolios.  
It should be noted that in the case of equally-weighted returns, the default risk premium is 
predominantly driven by the significantly high excess returns and alphas that the high default 
risk stocks yield. In the case of value-weighted returns, the portfolios containing the lowest 
default risk stocks exhibit negative (but insignificant) excess returns and significantly nega-
tive CAPM alphas. Therefore, in this case, the documented premium appears to be driven 
both by the outperformance of the highest default risk stocks and the underperformance of the 
lowest default risk stocks. As discussed in the Supplementary Appendix, a potential explana-
tion for this underperformance is that the lowest default risk quintile portfolio can provide a 
hedge against increases in aggregate default risk.14 
Furthermore, when we adjust portfolio returns for their size, value, and momentum factor 
loadings, the default risk premium is reduced by a third in the case of value-weighted portfo-
lios. In particular, the FFC alpha of the spread strategy Q5-Q1 is 8.13% p.a. (t-stat: 2.16) in 
the C6 and 7.86% p.a. (t-stat: 2.80) in the C14 countries. Figure 1 illustrates why adjusting for 
these additional factors reduces the alphas of the spread strategies in the case of value-
weighted portfolio returns. In particular, the portfolios containing the highest default risk 
stocks exhibit much higher SMB and HML betas relative to the portfolios containing the low-
est default risk stocks, with the lowest default risk portfolios exhibiting negative HML betas. 
Since the SMB and HML factors carry positive premia in our sample period, adjusting for 
value and size factor exposures reduces the magnitude of the default risk premium relative to 
the CAPM. At the same time, however, the highest default risk stocks are typically past year 
losers, so their portfolios exhibit negative MOM betas (see Figure 1). Therefore, the resulting 
                                                          
14 In particular, following the approach of Kapadia (2011), we find that the returns of the lowest (highest) 
default risk quintile portfolio are positively (negatively) associated with contemporaneous changes in ag-
gregate default risk, as measured by the median CHS default probability across firms in a given month. As 
a result, in line with intertemporal asset pricing theory, a risk averse investor may be willing to hold low 
default risk stocks, despite their underperformance, so as to hedge against adverse shocks in aggregate de-
fault risk.  
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default risk premium is higher when we adjust returns using the FFC model as compared to 
the FF model (results from the FF model are available upon request). Finally, we should note 
that in the case of equally-weighted portfolios, the magnitude and the statistical significance 
of the default risk premium remain intact regardless of the model we use to perform the risk-
adjustment.15 
[Figure 1 here] 
Whereas our results are certainly not driven by under-diversification (see the high num-
ber of stocks per portfolio), a potential concern is that they may be attributable to estimation 
error in the initial estimation windows, since these are often based on few bankruptcy filings. 
Figure 2 addresses this concern by plotting the cumulative profits of a trading strategy that is 
long the decile portfolio with the highest OOS CHS stocks (P10) and short the decile portfolio 
with the lowest OOS CHS stocks (P1). This figure shows that the profits of this strategy are 
not attributable solely to the initial years of the test period, and hence the reported magnitude 
of the default risk premium cannot be driven by estimation error in the initial windows. An-
other interesting conclusion derived from Figure 2 is that high default risk stocks outper-
formed during the 2003-2006 and 2009-2010 bull market periods, whereas, as expected, they 
were severely hit during the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. These patterns confirm that, in 
line with standard asset pricing theory, the highest default risk stocks perform poorly during 
"bad times", rendering them very risky, but earn a high premium during "good times" to com-
pensate risk averse investors for holding them. 
[Figure 2 here] 
                                                          
15 Equally-weighted portfolio returns and CAPM alphas are higher than the corresponding value-weighted 
portfolio returns and alphas across all default risk quantiles. This pattern is consistent with the existence of 
a significant size effect in our sample of international developed markets. The significance of this size ef-
fect is also confirmed in Fama-MacBeth regressions (see Table 7). Once we adjust portfolio returns for 
their SMB factor loadings via the FFC model, the wedge between equally- and value-weighted FFC alphas 
reported in Table 5 is reduced for the low and medium default risk portfolios, whereas it remains large for 
the highest default risk portfolio. This finding is consistent with the conjecture that there is a particular size 
effect within the highest default risk stocks, beyond the systematic size effect that is captured by the SMB 





4.2 Robustness Checks 
Table 6 reports the results from a series of robustness checks with respect to the magnitude of 
the default risk premium in the C6 (Panel A) and the C14 countries (Panel B). To save space, 
we only report the average excess returns of the extreme CHS-sorted quintile portfolios Q1 
and Q5 as well as of the spread strategy Q5-Q1. Results for all other portfolios and risk-
adjusted returns are available upon request. 
[Table 6 here] 
In the first robustness test, we set the returns of filing firms to −100% during their filing 
month, examining whether missing delisting returns could have led to an overestimation of 
the default risk premium reported in our benchmark results. In the second robustness test, we 
impose additional data filters.16 In the third robustness test, we do not impose a one-month 
gap between the portfolio formation date (December of year 𝑡 − 1) and the beginning of the 
holding period, which now becomes January of year 𝑡.17 
The corresponding results reported in Table 6 show that the premium derived from the 
spread strategy Q5-Q1 remains economically and statistically significant, and is very similar 
to the benchmark results reported in Table 5. The unreported CAPM and FFC portfolio alphas 
are also similar to the corresponding alphas reported in Table 5. More specifically, adjusting 
for market risk does not affect the magnitude of the default risk premium. However, adjusting 
for size and value premia captures part of the default risk premium, because the returns of the 
high default risk portfolios are positively associated with the SMB and HML factor returns. 
Nevertheless, the default risk premium remains significant in most cases. 
In addition, we have alternatively computed the international default risk premium as a 
value-weighted average of country-level premia. In particular, we firstly sort stocks into quan-
                                                          
16 In particular, we additionally omit stocks with a zero ex-dividend monthly return and stocks with incom-
plete market and accounting data in the year up to portfolio formation. 
17 We have also repeated this analysis using alternatively a longer gap of two or three months. Interestingly, 
we find that a longer gap renders the default risk premium larger and more significant. 
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tile portfolios for each country, and then average across countries. In this way, we can exam-
ine whether the reported default risk premium in our benchmark results is driven by within-
country or across-country variation in default probabilities. Unreported results, which are 
available upon request, show that the international default risk premium remains significant, 
especially when country-level portfolios are formed using equal weights. However, it is re-
duced relative to our benchmark approach. These results show that both within-country and 
across-country variation in default probabilities plays a role in the formation of the interna-
tional default risk premium, but the latter yields a stronger effect.18 
Finally, we have also examined whether FOREX effects could influence the magnitude of 
the reported default risk premium. In particular, in the unlikely case that the highest (lowest) 
default risk stocks in a given month are predominantly domiciled in countries whose curren-
cies simultaneously appreciate (depreciate) relative to the USD, then the reported default risk 
premium could have been driven by exchange rate movements rather than a genuine outper-
formance of the highest default risk stocks. To address this potential concern, we have exam-
ined the country composition of the default risk portfolios. We confirm that none of these 
portfolios is dominated by firms domiciled in a single country. This is particularly true for the 
highest and the lowest default risk portfolios that give rise to the reported premium.19  
 
4.3 Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
In this section, we further examine how robust is the positive relation between the CHS de-
fault risk measure and subsequent stock returns using Fama-MacBeth regressions. In particu-
lar, for each month of our sample we run cross-sectional regressions of excess stock returns 
on lagged CHS estimates and a series of lagged firm characteristics. Table 7 reports the aver-
                                                          
18 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this robustness test.   
19 Moreover, in unreported results, we have alternatively computed portfolio returns using local currency 
stock returns, i.e., without converting them to USD returns. In this case, we find that the default risk premi-
um remains positive and significant, and hence we exclude the possibility that exchange rate movements 
may be driving the reported default risk premium.  
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age slope coefficients estimated from these monthly regressions as well as their t-statistics 
computed using Newey-West standard errors. We have normalized each regressor by its 
standard deviation, and hence the corresponding Fama-MacBeth estimate can be interpreted 
as the effect of a one standard deviation increase in this firm characteristic on stock premia. 
 [Table 7 here] 
 Model 1 in Table 7 includes only CHS as regressor, documenting a strongly signifi-
cant positive relation between default risk and stock premia (t-stat: 7.23). The magnitude of 
the CHS coefficient accurately reflects the magnitude of the default risk premium derived 
from the univariate portfolio sorts in Table 5. In particular, a one standard deviation increase 
in default probability would increase the stock premium by 86 basis points per month. Model 
2 controls for firms’ beta, size and book-to-market value ratio. The results show that CHS is 
significantly priced in the presence of these commonly used firm characteristics, and hence it 
does not simply capture a size effect, even though the magnitude of the CHS coefficient is 
almost halved, as expected. 
 Another potential concern is that the positive relation between default risk and stock 
premia may be driven by a short-term return reversal effect (see Lehman, 1990, and Da and 
Gao, 2010) or by microstructure biases, such as the bid-ask bounce or infrequent trading, 
which are more pronounced for firms traded at low prices (see Blume and Stambaugh, 1983; 
Lo and MacKinlay, 2001). To address this concern, Model 3 additionally controls for momen-
tum, reversal and price effects. Whereas we find that the reversal and price effects are signifi-
cant indeed, the magnitude and the significance of the examined relation remain intact in the 
presence of these additional control variables. Finally, Model 4 also includes the default risk 
indicators that are used to estimate the CHS measure but are not already accounted for in the 
previous model specifications. In particular, we additionally control for stock return volatility 
(SIGMA), profitability (NIMTA), leverage (TLMTA) and cash holdings (CASHMTA). In 
this way, we address the potential concern that CHS may simply capture the explanatory 
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power of these firm characteristics with respect to stock premia. We find that the magnitude 
and significance of the CHS coefficient remain remarkably robust to the inclusion of these 
variables; CHS is priced in the cross-section of our international sample of stocks over and 
above its constituent variables. This is because CHS is a country-specific, non-linear trans-
formation of these firm characteristics, and hence their inclusion in the regression model in a 
linear fashion cannot absorb the explanatory ability of CHS. 
 Fama-MacBeth regressions also allow us to address the potential concern that the 
positive relation between default risk and stock returns may be driven by a particular country 
effect. To this end, we include a set of country dummies and re-estimate the previous model 
specifications. In particular, Model 5 includes only CHS apart from the country dummies, 
whereas Model 6 also contains the full set of firm characteristics that we used in Model 4. The 
results reported in Table 7 convincingly show that the benchmark results reported for Models 
1 and 4 remain unaffected by the addition of the country dummies. Based on this evidence, 
we conclude that the positive cross-sectional relation between default risk and stock returns is 
genuine and it is not driven by a particular country effect. 
  
4.4 MDD-sorted Portfolios 
The previous results indicate a robust positive default risk-stock return relation, which is 
markedly different from the findings of EGZ and GPS, who use MDD and EDF, respectively, 
to proxy for default risk. In this section, we examine the source of these different findings. To 
this end, we repeat the portfolio formation exercise using MDD as an alternative portfolio 
sorting criterion. MDD should be a close proxy for the proprietary EDF proxy, which is nei-
ther publicly available nor replicable for our international sample. For comparison purposes, 
we also report the corresponding results using our CHS estimates. However, the CHS portfo-
lios are now constructed using only firms for which both CHS and MDD are available, to en-
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sure that the same sample is examined. Table 8 reports equally- and value-weighted excess 
portfolio returns during the period 2000-2014 for both default risk measures. 
[Table 8 here] 
The results confirm the almost monotonic relation between CHS and portfolio premia for 
this subsample of firms. In sharp contrast, when MDD is used as sorting variable, a U-shape 
relation between default risk and portfolio returns emerges. As a result, the corresponding 
spread strategies using either quintile or decile portfolios yield premia that are very close to 
zero and insignificant. This finding is consistent for both value-weighted and equally-
weighted portfolio returns in the C6 and C14 countries. Hence, we confirm that using MDD 
as a default risk proxy, one would conclude that there is no default risk premium in our inter-
national sample, corroborating the puzzling evidence for the US market. 
Even though we confirm the findings of GPS and EGZ regarding the lack of a default risk 
premium on the basis of MDD, we have shown that MDD is an inferior default risk proxy rel-
ative to CHS, both in-sample and out-of-sample (see Section 3.3). In fact, the difference in the 
default risk premium estimates obtained from the two sets of portfolios is caused by the fact 
that CHS and MDD disagree on identifying both the lowest and the highest default risk firms. 
This discrepancy is exacerbated among the lowest default risk stocks and it becomes evident 
by examining the average CHS values across the MDD-sorted portfolios in the C14 countries. 
Though the firms in the highest MDD portfolios also exhibit the highest average CHS values, 
the lowest MDD decile portfolio (P1) contains firms with higher than average CHS estimates. 
Consistent with our previous findings, this portfolio yields a relatively higher mean excess re-
turn, exactly because it contains moderately distressed firms according to the CHS measure. 
A reason why these two proxies disagree on the classification of low default risk stocks is 
that Merton’s model assumes that default occurs once the asset value drops below a fraction 
of the book value of debt, implying that a zero default risk is assigned to stocks with no debt. 
Consistent with this idea, unreported results show that once we drop zero leverage firms from 
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our sample, the U-shape relation between MDD and portfolio returns becomes less pro-
nounced. Moreover, Merton’s model fails to take into account bankruptcy-triggering reasons 
other than insolvency. For example, Davydenko (2008) finds that, although most bankrupt 
firms are insolvent and illiquid, a fraction of them are only illiquid. Given that structural 
models, including the one used by Moody’s KMV, usually abstract from liquidity reserves, 
these models possibly classify firms with liquidity problems as low default risk.20 
 
5. What Drives the International Default Risk Premium? 
This section examines what drives the significant international default risk premium docu-
mented on the basis of the CHS measure in Section 4. In particular, we examine whether a se-
ries of country-level characteristics affect the magnitude and the significance of this premium. 
 Motivated by the evidence of Favara et al. (2012), we ask whether cross-country var-
iations with respect to creditor protection rights and shareholders’ ability to renege outstand-
ing debt affect the default risk premium. As Djankov et al. (2008) highlight, insolvency pro-
cedures considerably vary across countries; in countries where the legal framework and judi-
cial practices favor debt renegotiation and increase shareholders’ bargaining power relative to 
creditors’, we expect default risk to be less significantly priced. This is because shareholders’ 
expected payoffs in default may be higher, motivating them to default for strategic rather than 
solvency reasons. On the other hand, in countries where creditors have strict priority and can 
recover the proceeds of the insolvency procedure quickly and without incurring considerable 
costs, shareholders’ ability to extract rents from creditors is low, and hence the former should 
require a significant premium to invest in high default risk firms. 
                                                          
20 In the Supplementary Appendix, we also consider hybrid MDD default risk measures and examine their 
asset pricing implications. In sum, we find that adding only one of the CHS indicators to MDD is not suffi-
cient to yield a positive relation between the corresponding hybrid default risk measure and future stock re-
turns. However, the hybrid MDD measure computed by using the full set of CHS indicators together with 
MDD yields a significant positive default risk premium. 
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 To test these conjectures, we construct double-sorted portfolios on the basis of CHS 
and two alternative proxies for creditor rights at the country level. In particular, we use the 
Renegotiation Failure Index and the Creditors’ Recovery Rate from the survey of Djankov et 
al. (2008).21 The Renegotiation Failure Index summarizes a number of characteristics of debt 
enforcement procedures that protect creditors from shareholders’ strategic default (see 
Djankov et al., 2008, and Favara et al., 2012, for details). The higher the index score, the 
more difficult it is for shareholders to attempt to renege the outstanding debt. Creditors’ Re-
covery Rate is an inverse measure of the shareholders’ benefits to engage in strategic default. 
This index takes into account not only the order in which secured creditors are paid, but also 
the overall estimated costs of the insolvency procedure as well as its duration. The higher the 
creditors’ recovery rate, the lower the shareholders’ bargaining power. 
 The results from these double-sorted portfolios are reported in Table 9. We find that 
the default risk premium is economically and statistically significant mainly in countries 
where shareholders face considerable frictions in attempting to renegotiate the outstanding 
debt (High Renegotiation Failure) as well as in countries where creditors’ recovery rate is 
high. This evidence is in line with the arguments of Favara et al. (2012), showing that when 
shareholders’ bargaining power and their ability to extract rents from creditors are low, then 
the former require a significant default risk premium, which is close to 10% p.a.. To the con-
trary, in those countries where shareholders’ bargaining power is high and the judicial process 
favors debt renegotiation, the default risk premium is lower and statistically insignificant, 
since shareholders’ expected payoffs in default are higher, and hence default risk carries a 
lower price. These results hold for both value-weighted and equally-weighted portfolios.22 
[Table 9 here] 
                                                          
21 Available on Andrei Shleifer’s website: http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/. 
22 The explanation we put forward for the difference in the reported default risk premia implies that the 
price of default risk is high and significant only in the countries with high creditor protection and low 
shareholder bargaining power. However, this argumentation does not exclude the possibility that the spread 
between firms’ default probabilities could also be larger in these countries, thus contributing to the reported 
default risk premium differential. 
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 To further examine the shareholder advantage hypothesis at the firm level, we also 
construct double-sorted portfolios on the basis of CHS and firm tangibility. As Garlappi et al. 
(2008) and Garlappi and Yan (2011) argue, shareholders’ bargaining power decreases with 
asset tangibility, proxied by the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets. This is 
because the more tangible the assets are, the easier and less costly it is for creditors to liqui-
date them in the case of bankruptcy. The corresponding results from these double-sorted port-
folios, which are reported in Table 9, strongly support the shareholder advantage hypothesis. 
In particular, the default risk premium among firms with highly tangible assets is twice as 
high as the corresponding premium among firms with low tangibility. Actually, in the case of 
equally-weighted portfolios, the premium becomes insignificant among firms with low tangi-
bility. 
 Though our results strongly support the shareholder bargaining power hypothesis of 
Garlappi et al. (2008) at the firm level and Favara et al. (2012) at the country level, in the 
Supplementary Appendix we also examine alternative country-level characteristics as poten-
tial drivers of the international default risk premium. First, following GPS, we examine 
whether country-level investor overconfidence, as proxied by Hofstede’s (2001) individual-
ism index, has an effect on the price of default risk. Moreover, we examine whether the doc-
umented premium is affected by the depth of the local stock market, as proxied by its total 
trading volume relative to the country’s GDP, or by the degree of information asymmetry be-
tween firm managers and investors, as captured by the Accounting Standards Index of La Por-
ta et al. (1998). The corresponding results show that none of these alternative country-level 
characteristics has a considerable effect on the default risk premium, since this remains signif-






6. Systematic vs. Idiosyncratic Default Risk 
Our benchmark asset pricing results utilize CHS values estimated from LOGIT models to 
classify firms as high versus low default risk. However, a growing strand of the literature (see 
Anginer and Yildizhan, 2014; Friewald et al., 2014; and Hilscher and Wilson, 2015) argues 
that, in equilibrium, investors should require a premium for being exposed to systematic ra-
ther than firm-specific default risk. This is because systematic default risk is non-
diversifiable; default events are typically correlated and their cost depends on their timing. In 
fact, Hilscher and Wilson (2015) introduce the concept of "failure beta", defined as the sensi-
tivity of a firm’s default probability to the median cross-sectional default probability, and they 
show that it is a meaningful proxy for systematic default risk. Motivated by these arguments, 
in this section we decompose firms’ total default risk into its systematic and idiosyncratic 
components and examine which of the two is priced in our international sample. 
 To this end, we follow the regression decomposition approach of Anginer and Yild-
izhan (2014), estimating the following regression using a 48-month rolling window: 
    𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡𝑀𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,     (5) 
where 𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the default risk measure for firm i in month t and 𝑀𝐶𝐻𝑆𝑡 is the median cross-
sectional value of CHS in month t. The slope regression coefficient 𝛽𝑖,𝑡 is a proxy for the sys-
tematic default risk of firm i in month t, since it captures the sensitivity of the firm’s default 
risk to changes in aggregate default risk. Moreover, the idiosyncratic default risk component 
of firm i in month t is given by the sum of the intercept and the corresponding residual value. 
We perform this decomposition among firms in both the C6 and the C14 countries. 
 Having computed these systematic and idiosyncratic default risk measures, we alterna-
tively sort firms on the basis of each measure, classify them into portfolios and compute their 
post-ranking returns. The results are presented in the Supplementary Appendix. Since we use 
a window of 48 months to estimate 𝛽𝑖,𝑡, the test period now becomes 2004-2014. 
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 In line with the arguments of Anginer and Yildizhan (2014), we find that the systemat-
ic component of default risk carries a significant premium. In particular, the spread strategy 
that is long the quintile portfolio with the highest systematic default risk firms and short the 
quintile portfolio with the lowest systematic default risk firms, Q5-Q1, yields a premium of 
10.65% (10.29%) p.a. in the case of value-weighted (equally-weighted) portfolios in the C6 
countries. Similar is the evidence in the C14 countries, although the premium is marginally 
insignificant in the case of value-weighted portfolios. Adjusting for market, size, value, and 
momentum factor exposures, the Q5-Q1 strategy yields a significant FFC alpha in most of the 
cases examined, and hence the magnitude of the default risk premium remains intact. 
 To the contrary, sorting stocks on the basis of their idiosyncratic default risk estimates, 
we do not find a positive relation between this measure of default risk and post-ranking port-
folio returns. The spread strategy between the highest and the lowest idiosyncratic default risk 
quintile portfolios, Q5-Q1, yields a premium that is close to zero and insignificant in both the 
C6 and the C14 countries. Using the FFC model to adjust portfolio returns, we get very simi-
lar results. In sum, we find that consistent with the predictions of standard asset pricing theo-




Motivated by the lack of consensus on the pricing of default risk in the US market, this study 
examines this issue in a large sample of firms from 14 developed (ex US) markets and makes 
a number of contributions. First, we construct the largest dataset of non-US firm bankruptcies 
that has been examined in the literature. Second, utilizing this dataset, we estimate OOS firm 
default probabilities from country- and bankruptcy law-specific hazard models à la Campbell 
et al. (2008), and show that this default risk proxy has a clearly superior ability to forecast 
bankruptcies relative to Merton’s (1974) MDD measure, both in-sample and out-of-sample. 
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Third, we find a significant default risk premium in our international sample. The positive re-
lation between default risk and stock returns is robust to different portfolio weighting 
schemes, data filters, and holding period definitions, and remains intact after controlling for a 
series of firm characteristics. Fourth, we find that the systematic component of default risk 
drives this positive relation rather than the idiosyncratic one. 
Our results are in contrast to the conclusion of EGZ and GPS that a default risk puzzle 
exists in international markets too, which is derived on the basis of MDD and Moody’s KMV 
EDF, respectively. Showing that MDD is not a sufficient statistic for default probability and 
that it is inferior to CHS for bankruptcy forecasting, we derive a different conclusion because 
CHS disagrees with MDD predominantly on the identification of the lowest default risk firms. 
Finally, our international dataset allows us to examine what are the country-level charac-
teristics that drive the default premium. To this end, we find that the premium is relatively 
higher in countries where creditor protection is stronger and shareholder bargaining power is 
lower, in line with the arguments of Favara et al. (2012). Furthermore, consistent with the 
shareholder advantage hypothesis of Garlappi et al. (2008), we find that the default risk pre-
mium is more pronounced among firms with high asset tangibility. 
Echoing the concerns of Chava and Purnanandam (2010), our results indicate that the dis-
tress anomaly could be specific to the US market. Therefore, as the quality of international 
bankruptcy filing data is bound to improve in the future, there is scope for expanding the 
cross-section of firms by considering less developed markets as well as extending the time pe-
riod to study the behavior of the default risk premium across different economic conditions. 
Another important research direction is to delve further into the drivers of the default risk 
premium outside the US market. Of particular interest is the question whether proposed ex-
planations for the anomalous returns of US distressed stocks, such as differences in corporate 
liquidity (Medhat, 2014) and lottery-like payoffs of distressed stocks (Conrad et al., 2014) can 
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Number and Proportion of Bankruptcies per Country and Year 
 
 
This table reports the total number of bankruptcies (#B), the total number of active firms with complete data (#ALL) and the proportion of active firms with complete data that 
went bankrupt (%) each year in our sample period and over the full sample period (1992-2013). This information is reported for Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and 








Year #B #ALL % #B #ALL % #B #ALL % #B #ALL % #B #ALL % #B #ALL % #B #ALL %
1992 14 1,176 1.19 14 1,176 1.19
1993 2 463 0.43 2 1,798 0.11 5 1,166 0.43 9 3,427 0.26
1994 0 468 0.00 0 1,889 0.00 3 1,175 0.26 3 3,532 0.08
1995 1 482 0.21 1 342 0.29 1 2,012 0.05 4 1,200 0.33 7 4,036 0.17
1996 1 256 0.39 0 383 0.00 4 472 0.85 2 351 0.57 1 2,080 0.05 8 1,215 0.66 16 4,757 0.34
1997 1 304 0.33 2 413 0.48 1 536 0.19 1 410 0.24 8 2,136 0.37 6 1,375 0.44 19 5,174 0.37
1998 2 328 0.61 0 441 0.00 2 659 0.30 1 477 0.21 7 2,311 0.30 11 1,496 0.74 23 5,712 0.40
1999 1 362 0.28 4 579 0.69 1 770 0.13 4 539 0.74 3 2,861 0.10 16 1,464 1.09 29 6,576 0.44
2000 3 496 0.60 4 748 0.54 1 845 0.12 3 640 0.47 11 2,990 0.37 7 1,383 0.51 29 7,101 0.41
2001 8 734 1.09 3 875 0.34 3 879 0.34 16 742 2.16 11 3,047 0.36 22 1,347 1.63 63 7,625 0.83
2002 6 1,214 0.49 3 926 0.32 10 870 1.15 29 776 3.74 29 3,174 0.91 24 1,336 1.80 101 8,297 1.22
2003 6 1,243 0.48 1 1,070 0.09 10 824 1.21 16 744 2.15 18 3,240 0.56 16 1,301 1.23 67 8,422 0.80
2004 5 1,254 0.40 4 1,197 0.33 4 776 0.52 9 705 1.28 11 3,293 0.33 10 1,267 0.79 43 8,493 0.51
2005 6 1,364 0.44 1 1,336 0.07 3 735 0.41 4 689 0.58 8 3,404 0.24 9 1,342 0.67 31 8,869 0.35
2006 7 1,485 0.47 6 1,964 0.31 2 747 0.27 6 705 0.85 2 3,523 0.06 7 1,493 0.47 30 9,917 0.30
2007 7 1,609 0.44 5 2,328 0.21 3 787 0.38 13 766 1.70 6 3,651 0.16 5 1,622 0.31 39 10,763 0.36
2008 20 1,747 1.14 7 2,480 0.28 0 803 0.00 9 832 1.08 32 3,678 0.87 33 1,663 1.98 101 11,203 0.90
2009 22 1,795 1.23 6 2,531 0.24 8 782 1.02 24 832 2.88 32 3,600 0.89 38 1,594 2.38 130 11,134 1.17
2010 4 1,767 0.23 6 2,554 0.23 7 758 0.92 10 817 1.22 5 3,533 0.14 13 1,507 0.86 45 10,935 0.41
2011 9 1,802 0.50 10 2,672 0.37 9 758 1.19 3 814 0.37 2 3,560 0.06 10 1,592 0.63 43 11,198 0.38
2012 10 1,845 0.54 11 2,777 0.40 8 736 1.09 10 791 1.26 4 3,534 0.11 17 1,562 1.09 60 11,244 0.53
2013 8 1,805 0.44 15 2,715 0.55 1 701 0.14 4 754 0.53 3 3,446 0.09 11 1,472 0.75 42 10,894 0.39
1992-2013 126 21,410 0.59 88 27,989 0.31 80 14,850 0.54 165 12,729 1.30 196 62,760 0.31 289 30,748 0.94 944 170,484 0.55






This table presents summary statistics (means, medians and standard deviations) for each of the following variables: 
NIMTA (net income scaled by the sum of market value of equity and total liabilities), TLMTA (total liabilities scaled by 
the sum of market value of equity and total liabilities), EXRET (monthly log stock return of a firm minus that of the in-
dex of the market in which the firm is headquartered), RSIZE (log ratio of a firm’s market value to the sum of market 
values for all firms in the same market and month), SIGMA (annualized standard deviation of a firm’s daily log stock 
return in the prior three months), CASHMTA (ratio of cash and short-term assets to the sum of market value of equity 
and total liabilities), MB (market-to-book value ratio) and PRICE (log stock price). In each panel, the statistics are re-
ported for active firms (act) as well as for bankrupt firms (bank) in the month prior to their filing (t-1). The statistics are 
reported for Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the UK (the C6 countries) over the period 1992-2013. In 






act bank act bank act bank act bank act bank act bank act bank act bank
Panel A: Australia
Mean -0.10 -0.25 0.25 0.63 0.00 -0.11 -10.16 -11.59 0.72 1.12 0.17 0.14 2.12 1.50 -0.96 -1.69
Median -0.02 -0.14 0.17 0.71 -0.01 -0.08 -10.47 -11.92 0.68 1.09 0.07 0.05 1.45 0.56 -0.92 -1.86
St.Dev 0.24 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.16 0.17 2.03 1.39 0.39 0.43 0.26 0.23 1.80 2.11 1.20 1.15
All firm/months (N=256,918); Bankruptcy Group (N=126)
Panel B: Canada
Mean -0.10 -0.39 0.26 0.64 0.00 -0.18 -10.46 -12.46 0.89 1.59 0.14 0.15 2.35 2.25 0.08 -1.25
Median -0.02 -0.29 0.17 0.74 -0.01 -0.25 -10.50 -12.92 0.80 1.51 0.05 0.05 1.64 0.75 0.21 -1.51
St.Dev 0.25 0.42 0.26 0.25 0.18 0.25 2.29 2.10 0.56 0.64 0.22 0.24 1.97 2.58 1.43 1.23
All firm/months (N=335,867); Bankruptcy Group (N=88)
Panel C: France
Mean 0.01 -0.07 0.47 0.70 0.00 -0.04 -9.52 -11.93 0.44 0.67 0.10 0.07 2.06 2.67 2.86 1.95
Median 0.02 -0.06 0.47 0.78 -0.05 -0.04 -9.78 -12.20 0.39 0.60 0.07 0.03 1.56 1.36 2.93 1.67
St.Dev 0.06 0.10 0.25 0.27 0.10 0.13 2.14 1.33 0.23 0.32 0.10 0.11 1.57 2.40 0.91 0.83
All firm/months (N=178,198); Bankruptcy Group (N=80)
Panel D: Germany
Mean -0.02 -0.15 0.44 0.76 -0.01 -0.07 -9.41 -11.67 0.50 1.10 0.12 0.16 2.19 1.46 2.28 1.26
Median 0.01 -0.07 0.43 0.85 -0.01 -0.12 -9.56 -11.92 0.43 1.10 0.06 0.06 1.67 0.54 2.40 1.07
St.Dev 0.14 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.12 0.19 1.99 1.50 0.32 0.46 0.17 0.22 1.69 2.00 1.06 0.85
All firms/months (N=152,742); Bankruptcy Group (N=165)
Panel E: Japan
Mean 0.01 -0.02 0.54 0.82 0.00 -0.02 -9.95 -11.33 0.41 0.74 0.17 0.11 1.30 1.26 6.36 5.90
Median 0.02 -0.01 0.56 0.91 -0.01 -0.05 -10.09 -11.52 0.37 0.77 0.13 0.08 1.02 0.68 6.35 5.59
St.Dev 0.04 0.05 0.23 0.20 0.09 0.15 1.56 1.15 0.19 0.25 0.13 0.10 0.94 1.30 0.68 0.74
All firms/months (N=753,115); Bankruptcy Group (N=196)
Panel F: United Kingdom
Mean -0.02 -0.17 0.38 0.73 0.00 -0.10 -9.84 -12.33 0.39 0.72 0.10 0.11 2.31 1.87 4.36 3.13
Median 0.02 -0.12 0.35 0.80 -0.01 -0.13 -9.94 -12.33 0.35 0.73 0.05 0.04 1.63 0.56 4.52 3.27
St.Dev 0.14 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.11 0.16 2.03 1.18 0.22 0.28 0.15 0.19 1.91 2.51 1.01 0.75
All firms/months (N=368,944); Bankruptcy Group (N=289)
Panel G: All Countries
Mean -0.03 -0.16 0.41 0.73 0.00 -0.08 -9.96 -11.88 0.54 0.92 0.14 0.12 1.89 1.72 3.44 2.22
Median 0.01 -0.07 0.40 0.81 -0.01 -0.09 -10.08 -12.08 0.43 0.84 0.09 0.05 1.32 0.62 4.01 2.30
St.Dev 0.16 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.13 0.18 1.95 1.43 0.38 0.47 0.17 0.19 1.63 2.20 2.95 2.68
All firms/months (N=2,045,784); Bankruptcy Group (N=944)




Logit Regressions of Bankruptcy Indicator on 12-month Lagged Predictor Variables 
 
This table reports results from country-specific LOGIT regressions of a bankruptcy indicator on a set of predic-
tors (listed and defined below) that are lagged by 12 months. NIMTA is net income scaled by the sum of the 
market value of equity and total liabilities. TLMTA is total liabilities scaled by the sum of the market value of 
equity and total liabilities. EXRET is the monthly log stock return of a firm minus that of the index of the market 
in which the firm is headquartered. RSIZE is the log ratio of a firm’s market value to the sum of market values 
for all firms in the same market and month. SIGMA is the annualized standard deviation of a firm’s daily log 
stock returns in the prior three months. CASHMTA is the ratio of cash and short-term assets to the sum of the 
market value of equity and total liabilities. MB is the market-to-book value ratio, whereas PRICE is the log stock 
price. Estimated coefficients are in bold, whereas z-statistics, which are constructed using heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors, are reported in square brackets. The column titled ‘LR test’ reports the results from a like-
lihood ratio test on whether the coefficients of each predictor differ significantly across the six countries. The 
bold number in the last column is twice the difference between the log-likelihood of a pooled LOGIT model in-
cluding country-specific interaction terms on all predictors (including constants) except for the variable in the 
row in which the statistic is reported (restricted model), and that from a pooled LOGIT model including all coun-
try interactions terms (unrestricted model). The p-value associated with the LR test statistic is shown below in 














NIMTA -0.029 -1.347 *** -4.879 *** -0.729 ** 1.080 -0.987 *** 19.13 ***
[-0.09] [-3.67] [-3.41] [-2.27] [0.81] [-3.26] (0.00)
TLMTA 2.765 *** 2.941 *** 0.745 1.772 *** 4.709 *** 1.846 *** 40.23 ***
[7.58] [7.44] [1.24] [5.10] [7.96] [7.34] (0.00)
EXRET -1.848 *** -1.402 ** 0.247 -0.093 -0.899 -1.048 ** 7.17
[-2.97] [-2.11] [0.26] [-0.14] [-1.40] [-2.11] (0.31)
RSIZE -0.062 0.317 *** -0.373 *** -0.214 *** -0.217 *** -0.157 *** 31.90 ***
[-0.89] [3.59] [-4.24] [-3.92] [-4.15] [-4.19] (0.00)
SIGMA 1.019 *** 0.022 0.991 ** 1.004 *** 2.075 *** 0.907 *** 32.21 ***
[4.42] [0.11] [2.10] [5.44] [7.09] [3.78] (0.00)
CASHMTA -1.622 *** -0.843 * -2.938 * -0.241 -2.622 *** -2.378 *** 15.57 **
[-2.58] [-1.92] [-1.67] [-0.51] [-3.01] [-4.12] (0.02)
MB -0.048 -0.044 0.004 0.009 0.243 *** -0.001 21.23 ***
[-0.97] [-0.86] [0.08] [0.18] [3.82] [-0.04] (0.00)
PRICE 0.169 -0.821 *** -0.141 -0.006 0.423 *** -0.275 *** 54.09 ***
[1.40] [-4.79] [-0.73] [-0.05] [3.62] [-3.83] (0.00)
CONSTANT -9.582 *** -6.055 *** -12.016 *** -10.466 *** -17.074 *** -8.687 ***
[-15.76] [-6.77] [-9.99] [-16.07] [-16.05] [-13.38]
Observations 227,492 291,601 144,618 134,225 632,063 274,108
Failures 115 86 70 152 190 244








Logit Regressions including Merton’s Distance-to-Default and Accuracy Ratios 
 
This table reports selected results from country-specific LOGIT regressions of a bankruptcy indicator 
on sets of predictors that are lagged by 12 months. As exogenous variables, the models use either (i) 
only Merton’s (1974) Distance-to-Default (MDD) in Panel A, or (ii) MDD together with the Campbell 
et al. (2008, CHS) default risk indicators, namely NIMTA, TLMTA, EXRET, RSIZE, SIGMA, 
CASHMTA, MB and PRICE (see the caption of Table 3 for a description of these variables) in Panel 
B or (iii) only the CHS default risk indicators in Panel C. The LOGIT models in Panels A-C are esti-
mated using only the firm-month observations and failures for which both MDD and the CHS default 
risk indicators are available. Reported results refer to the slope coefficient of MDD (in bold) and the 
associated z-statistic, computed using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (in square brackets) 
where applicable, as well as the pseudo R2 of each model. To construct the MDD measure, we follow 
the methodology of Vassalou and Xing (2004) (see Section 3.1 for details). ***, ** and * denote sta-
tistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Panel D reports the average accuracy ra-
tios of the CHS and MDD default risk measures for each of the C6 countries. The accuracy ratio is 
given by the ratio of each measure’s area under curve divided by the area under curve of the “perfect 
foresight measure”, which could ex ante assign the highest default risk rank exactly to those firms that 
subsequently defaulted. We follow the methodology of Vassalou and Xing (2004) to compute areas 







Panel A : Merton (1974) Distance-to-Default
MDD 2.739 *** 2.416 *** 2.955 *** 2.905 *** 3.104 *** 2.617 ***
[9.33] [6.61] [7.08] [14.36] [16.43] [13.08]
Pseudo-R2 0.044 0.033 0.047 0.066 0.041 0.039
Panel B : Merton (1974) Distance-to-Default + CHS Default Risk Indicators
MDD 0.991 * 0.251 1.225 1.606 *** 0.783 ** 0.402
[1.84] [0.44] [1.49] [4.44] [2.45] [1.17]
Pseudo-R2 0.079 0.078 0.093 0.084 0.085 0.079
Panel C : CHS Default Risk Indicators
Pseudo-R2 0.077 0.078 0.089 0.073 0.083 0.078
Observations 179,723 215,544 102,149 104,591 485,069 180,814
Failures 76 50 39 148 169 156
Panel D : Accuracy Ratios
CHS 0.651 0.720 0.581 0.693 0.467 0.750
MDD 0.571 0.665 0.459 0.618 0.312 0.671





Out-of-Sample Global Default Risk Portfolios 
 
This table reports average excess returns, CAPM alphas, and four-factor alphas from the Fama-French-Carhart asset pricing model (FFC al-
phas) for portfolios constructed on the basis of out-of-sample (OOS) estimates of the Campbell et al. (2008, CHS) default risk measure. We 
construct these portfolios for stocks in the C6 countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom; Panel A) and 
the C14 countries (the C6 countries plus Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Taiwan; Panel B). To 
estimate OOS CHS measures, a LOGIT model is recursively run for each of the C6 countries; see Section 3. For the countries that feature too 
few bankruptcies, we run recursively a LOGIT model for each bankruptcy law regime. We consider four bankruptcy law regimes: Common 
Law (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, New Zealand and the U.K.), Napoleonic (France, Spain and Portugal), Roman-Germanic (Denmark, 
Finland, Germany and Sweden) and Mixed (Japan and Taiwan). The recursive LOGIT estimations start with an initial window including data 
up to December 1999. At the end of December of year t-1, we sort stocks in ascending order on the basis of their OOS CHS default risk es-
timates and allocate them into decile and quintile portfolios. We form the spread strategy Q5-Q1 that is long the quintile portfolio with the 
highest default risk stocks (Q5) and short the quintile portfolio with the lowest default risk stocks (Q1). We also form the spread strategy 
P10-P1 that is long the decile portfolio with the highest default risk stocks (P10) and short the decile portfolio with the lowest default risk 
stocks (P1). We exclude stocks whose price or market capitalization is below the 5th percentile of the corresponding country-month distribu-
tion at the portfolio formation date. Portfolios are held from February of year t to January of year t+1, at which point they are rebalanced, al-
lowing for a one month gap between the portfolio formation date and the beginning of the holding period. Returns are calculated in USD 
terms and they are reported for value-weighted (vw) and equally-weighted (ew) portfolios. Average excess portfolio returns and alphas are 
annualized and bolded; their associated t-statistics are reported in square brackets. We use the Developed Markets Global ex US Fama-
French market, size, value, and momentum factors, sourced from K. French’s online data library; see Fama and French (2012, p. 459-460) 
for their construction details. The lower part of each panel reports the (equally-weighted) average number of firms per portfolio, stocks’ av-
erage standard deviation of returns (SIGMA), their average log relative size (RSIZE) and their average OOS CHS default probability esti-






Panel A: C6 Countries
Excess return vw -2.66 -3.01 1.06 2.54 6.48 9.75 11.80 13.86 *** 14.46 **
[-0.51] [-0.48] [0.19] [0.44] [1.01] [1.35] [1.35] [2.71] [2.26]
ew 4.49 3.37 5.32 6.98 8.91 10.48 17.86 ** 10.24 ** 13.37 **
[0.77] [0.51] [0.79] [0.96] [1.19] [1.37] [2.05] [2.43] [2.41]
CAPM alpha vw -5.11 * -6.16 ** -2.55 *** -1.21 2.49 5.52 7.48 12.41 ** 12.59 **
[-1.96] [-2.28] [-3.42] [-0.95] [1.12] [1.64] [1.44] [2.47] [2.11]
ew 2.30 0.39 1.65 2.95 4.90 6.54 * 13.88 *** 8.87 ** 11.58 **
[0.58] [0.09] [0.52] [0.98] [1.54] [1.94] [2.63] [2.43] [2.32]
FFC alpha vw -3.82 ** -5.88 *** -1.77 ** -1.14 -0.30 1.01 5.68 8.13 ** 9.50 *
[-2.07] [-2.74] [-2.14] [-1.20] [-0.13] [0.43] [1.20] [2.16] [1.67]
ew 0.37 -1.40 -0.09 1.78 3.20 5.29 ** 13.52 *** 9.92 *** 13.15 ***
[0.14] [-0.53] [-0.05] [0.91] [1.55] [2.55] [3.88] [2.95] [3.00]
average # of firms 823 823 1646 1646 1646 823 823
average sigma 0.40 0.47 0.51 0.53 0.56 0.60 0.72
average RSIZE -9.54 -9.73 -9.57 -9.61 -10.05 -10.66 -11.36
average CHS 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 0.08% 0.14% 0.50%
1 2 3-4 5-6 7-8
Deciles
9 10 P10-P1Q5-Q1





Table 5 (continued) 







Panel B: C14 Countries
Mean excess return vw -2.14 -3.12 1.74 2.56 4.99 10.01 11.12 13.42 *** 13.26 **
[-0.42] [-0.49] [0.30] [0.43] [0.76] [1.39] [1.33] [3.03] [2.34]
ew 4.85 3.21 5.52 6.98 9.07 10.37 17.67 ** 9.99 *** 12.82 ***
[0.85] [0.53] [0.83] [0.97] [1.21] [1.36] [2.06] [2.66] [2.72]
CAPM alpha vw -4.87 ** -6.53 *** -1.95 ** -1.25 0.93 5.82 * 6.82 12.26 *** 11.69 **
[-2.15] [-2.98] [2.12] [-1.15] [0.52] [1.91] [1.46] [2.83] [2.24]
ew 2.27 0.10 1.76 2.94 5.03 * 6.42 ** 13.68 *** 8.86 *** 11.41 ***
[0.66] [0.03] [0.63] [1.05] [1.69] [2.07] [2.85] [2.88] [2.80]
FFC alpha vw -3.31 ** -6.47 *** 0.23 -0.50 -0.84 1.25 5.23 7.86 *** 8.54 **
[-2.38] [-3.84] [0.22] [-0.41] [-0.45] [0.57] [1.30] [2.80] [2.02]
ew 0.62 -1.34 1.12 1.98 3.46 * 4.91 ** 13.22 *** 9.43 *** 12.60 ***
[0.26] [-0.58] [0.64] [1.02] [1.72] [2.44] [4.30] [3.44] [3.78]
average # of firms 1028 1028 2056 2056 2056 1028 1028
average sigma 0.39 0.44 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.60 0.72
average RSIZE -9.18 -9.16 -9.01 -9.24 -9.78 -10.44 -11.17
average CHS 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 0.08% 0.13% 0.52%







This table reports the results of three robustness tests regarding data filters, and the beginning of the portfolio holding 
period. Results are reported only for the extreme quintile CHS-sorted stock portfolios (Q1 and Q5) and the spread strat-
egy Q5-Q1 that is long the quintile portfolio with the highest default risk stocks (Q5) and short the quintile portfolio 
with the lowest default risk stocks (Q1). The average excess portfolio returns are annualized and bolded; their associat-
ed t-statistics are in square brackets. We construct these portfolios for stocks in the C6 countries (Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom; Panel A) and for stocks in the C14 countries (the C6 countries plus 
Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Taiwan; Panel B). Returns are expressed in 
USD terms in excess of the USD risk-free rate. Returns are reported for both value-weighted (vw) and equally-weighted 
(ew) portfolios. The first robustness test (“Return of Defaulting Stocks=−100%”) repeats the analysis of Table 5 setting 
the returns of filing firms to −100% during their filing month. The second robustness test (“Additional Data Filters”) re-
peats the analysis of Table 5 excluding in addition stocks with a zero ex-dividend monthly return and stocks with in-
complete data on the market and accounting variables used in the LOGIT model in the prior 12 months. The third ro-
bustness test (“No Gap Between Formation & Holding Period”) repeats the analysis of Table 5 leaving no gap between 
the portfolio formation month (i.e., December of year t-1) and the beginning of the holding period, which now becomes 














Panel A: C6 Countries
Return of Defaulting Stocks = -100% -2.93 10.83 13.76 *** 3.87 12.86 8.99 **
[-0.52] [1.42] [2.70] [0.63] [1.60] [2.13]
Additional Data Filters 0.45 11.53 11.08 ** 6.08 15.62 * 9.54 **
[0.09] [1.44] [2.32] [1.00] [1.87] [2.11]
No Gap Between Formation & Holding Period -3.75 11.66 15.41 *** 3.96 14.67 * 10.71 **
[-0.65] [1.53] [2.80] [0.63] [1.85] [2.45]
Panel B: C14 Countries
Return of Defaulting Stocks = -100% -2.56 10.73 13.29 *** 3.97 12.86 8.89 **
[-0.45] [1.43] [3.00] [0.68] [1.61] [2.36]
Additional Data Filters 0.58 11.76 11.18 *** 6.32 15.98 * 9.66 **
[0.12] [1.48] [2.60] [1.09] [1.93] [2.36]
No Gap Between Formation & Holding Period -3.00 11.57 14.57 *** 4.10 14.59 * 10.49 ***
[-0.53] [1.57] [3.08] [0.69] [1.86] [2.79]
Value-weighted Portfolios Equally-weighted Portfolios








This table reports the results from Fama-MacBeth regressions on the relation between Campbell et al.’s (2008, CHS) 
default risk measure and subsequent stock returns. For each month of our sample we run cross-sectional regressions 
of excess stock returns on lagged CHS estimates and a set of firm characteristics that are also lagged. These include 
beta, log size, book-to-market value ratio (B/M), prior year stock return (MOMENTUM), prior month stock return 
(REVERSAL), PRICE, SIGMA, NIMTA, TLMTA and CASHMTA. Each firm characteristic is normalized by its 
standard deviation. Beta has been calculated using past 60 months’ stock returns. Models 5 and 6 include country 
dummies. The coefficients are reported as time-series averages of the estimates from the cross-sectional regressions. 
The t-statistics, which are reported in brackets, are based on the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 














CHS 0.0086 *** 0.0047 *** 0.0036 *** 0.0048 *** 0.0084 *** 0.0048 ***
[7.23] [4.60] [3.60] [5.05] [7.20] [5.34]
BETA          - 0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0006          - -0.0007
[0.11] [-1.01] [-0.52] [-0.67]
LN(MV)          - -0.0071 *** -0.0044 *** -0.0051 ***          - -0.0016 **
[-5.09] [-4.39] [-5.94] [-2.10]
B/M          - 0.0016 * 0.0015 * 0.0011          - 0.0018 **
[1.69] [1.73] [1.45] [2.42]
MOMENTUM          -          - 0.0011 0.0021          - 0.0021
[0.78] [1.53] [1.46]
REVERSAL          -          - -0.0016 ** -0.0013 *          - -0.0011 **
[-2.35] [-1.91] [-1.98]
PRICE          -          - -0.0056 *** -0.0064 ***          - -0.0119 ***
[-3.94] [-5.02] [-10.64]
SIGMA          -          -          - -0.0030 ***          - -0.0033 ***
[-4.54] [-4.01]
NIMTA          -          -          - 0.0017 **          - 0.0020 ***
[1.99] [3.19]
TLMTA          -          -          - 0.0013          - 0.0004
[1.06] [0.51]
CASHMTA          -          -          - 0.0039 ***          - 0.0031 ***
[4.05] [4.27]
CONSTANT 0.0063 0.0249 *** 0.0232 *** 0.0232 *** 0.0108 0.0134 **
[1.07] [3.92] [3.81] [3.00] [1.18] [2.00]
Country Dummies No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1,928,527 1,444,725 1,436,565 1,435,710 1,928,527 1,435,710




Comparison of CHS and MDD-Sorted Portfolio Returns 
 
This table reports average excess returns for portfolios sorted on the basis of out-of-sample (OOS) estimates of the Campbell 
et al. (2008, CHS) default risk measure or, alternatively, estimates of Merton’s (1974) Distance-to-Default measure (MDD). 
We construct these portfolios for stocks in the C6 countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the U.K.; Panel 
A) and the C14 countries (the C6 countries plus Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
Taiwan; Panel B). The OOS CHS measures are recursively estimated as described in Section 3 and the caption of Table 5. 
We follow the methodology of Vassalou and Xing (2004) to estimate MDD for each firm in our sample. At the end of De-
cember of year t-1, we sort stocks in ascending order on the basis of their OOS CHS or, alternatively, on the basis of their 
OOS MDD estimates and allocate them into decile and quintile portfolios. We form the spread strategy Q5-Q1 that is long 
the quintile portfolio with the highest default risk stocks (Q5) and short the quintile portfolio with the lowest default risk 
stocks (Q1). We also form the spread strategy P10-P1 that is long the decile portfolio with the highest default risk stocks 
(P10) and short the decile portfolio with the lowest default risk stocks (P1). We only consider stocks for which both default 
risk proxies are available. We exclude stocks whose price or market capitalization is below the 5 th percentile of the corre-
sponding country-month distribution at the portfolio formation date. Portfolios are held from February of year t to January of 
year t+1, at which point they are rebalanced, allowing for a one-month gap between the portfolio formation date and the be-
ginning of the holding period. Returns are calculated in U.S. dollar terms and they are reported for both value-weighted (vw) 
and equally-weighted (ew) portfolios. Average excess portfolio returns are annualized and bolded; their associated t-statistics 
are reported in square brackets. The lower part of each panel reports the average number of firms per portfolio. For the 
MDD-sorted portfolios, it also reports stocks’ average standard deviation of returns (SIGMA), their average log relative size 
(RSIZE) and their average OOS CHS default risk estimate. The examined period is 2000-2014. ***, ** and * denote statisti-







Panel A: C6 Countries
CHS vw -2.56 -2.65 1.05 2.66 6.56 10.16 12.04 14.03 *** 14.60 **
[0.50] [-0.43] [0.19] [0.47] [1.03] [1.42] [1.39] [2.78] [2.31]
ew 4.75 3.64 4.85 6.88 8.72 10.80 18.26 ** 10.34 ** 13.51 **
[0.85] [0.58] [0.75] [0.98] [1.18] [1.44] [2.10] [2.39] [2.35]
MDD vw 2.90 2.61 0.94 0.67 0.83 2.94 5.01 1.21 2.11
[0.47] [0.45] [0.18] [0.12] [0.13] [0.36] [0.57] [0.27] [0.43]
ew 13.80 9.63 5.01 4.59 6.45 7.68 15.14 * -0.86 1.34
[1.59] [1.13] [0.87] [0.78] [1.00] [1.00] [1.66] [-0.21] [0.25]
average # of firms 770 767 1518 1510 1521 761 743
average sigma 0.69 0.62 0.42 0.40 0.47 0.57 0.77
average RSIZE -10.54 -10.20 -9.18 -9.21 -9.97 -10.57 -11.10
average CHS 0.10% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.08% 0.16% 0.32%
Panel B: C14 Countries
CHS vw -1.98 -2.72 1.71 2.67 5.00 10.39 11.29 13.49 *** 13.27 **
[-0.39] [-0.43] [0.29] [0.45] [0.76] [1.46] [1.35] [3.06] [2.34]
ew 5.23 3.70 5.32 7.01 9.04 10.85 18.08 ** 9.96 *** 12.85 ***
[0.95] [0.64] [0.82] [1.00] [1.22] [1.44] [2.11] [2.60] [2.60]
MDD vw 2.52 1.44 1.27 0.76 1.60 2.51 4.30 1.11 1.78
[0.43] [0.27] [0.23] [0.13] [0.25] [0.29] [0.49] [0.27] [0.41]
ew 13.11 9.70 4.98 5.00 6.78 9.20 15.14 * 0.77 2.02
[1.60] [1.19] [0.89] [0.83] [1.02] [1.19] [1.67] [0.21] [0.43]
average # of firms 963 959 1898 1893 1902 947 928
average sigma 0.66 0.59 0.39 0.40 0.47 0.56 0.75
average RSIZE -10.32 -9.84 -8.69 -8.86 -9.59 -10.21 -10.75
average CHS 0.12% 0.04% 0.03% 0.04% 0.09% 0.16% 0.30%
Deciles




Double-Sorted Portfolios  
 
This table reports average excess returns for double-sorted portfolios on the basis of out-of-sample (OOS) es-
timates of the Campbell et al. (2008, CHS) default risk measure and each of the following country/firm char-
acteristics: (i) RENEGOTIATION FAILURE, which is an index that summarizes a number of characteristics 
of debt enforcement procedures that protect creditors from shareholders’ strategic default (see Djankov et al., 
2008, and Favara et al., 2012, for details), (ii) CREDITOR RECOVERY RATE, which is an inverse measure 
of the shareholders’ benefits to engage in strategic default. In particular, this index takes into account not on-
ly the order in which secured creditors are paid, but also the overall estimated costs of the insolvency proce-
dure as well as its duration, and (iii) TANGIBILITY, which is the (firm-level) ratio of property, plant and 
equipment to total assets.  Panel A reports results based on value-weighted global portfolio returns whereas 
Panel B reports results based on equal-weighted global portfolio returns. The OOS CHS default risk 
measures are recursively estimated as described in Section 3 and the caption of Table 5. We sort stocks into 
ascending order according to their OOS CHS default risk estimates in December of year 𝑡 − 1 and allocate 
them into tercile portfolios (T1 to T3), and we also independently sort stocks into ascending order according 
to the value of each country/firm characteristic in December of year 𝑡 − 1 and allocate them into tercile port-
folios (Low, Medium, High). The intersection of these two classifications yields the double-sorted portfolios. 
Portfolios are held from February of year 𝑡 to January of year 𝑡 + 1, at which point they are rebalanced, al-
lowing for a one month gap between the portfolio formation date and the beginning of the holding period. 
Results are reported only for the highest and the lowest default risk tercile portfolios (T3 and T1, respective-
ly) within the High or the Low classification for each country/firm characteristic, respectively. Moreover, we 
report the average excess return for the spread strategy T3-T1 within the High or Low classification. For 
comparison, column ALL reports the returns for the tercile portfolios T3 and T1 from univariate sorts accord-
ing to OOS CHS default risk estimates. Returns are calculated in U.S. dollar. Average excess portfolio re-
turns are annualized and bolded; their associated t-statistics are reported in square brackets. The examined 




CHS ALL High Low High Low High Low
Panel A: Value-weighted Global Portfolios Based on C14 Countries
T3 7.56 8.02 3.03 6.41 6.08 10.85 3.68
[1.12] [1.04] [0.44] [0.91] [0.82] [1.34] [0.42]
T1 -1.71 0.09 0.87 -3.42 2.27 -3.92 -3.77
[-0.29] [0.01] [0.18] [-0.58] [0.39] [-0.58] [-0.51]
Spread (T3-T1) 9.27 *** 7.93 * 2.16 9.83 ** 3.81 14.77 *** 7.45 **
[2.70] [1.87] [0.78] [2.09] [1.33] [3.65] [2.11]
Panel B: Equally-weighted Global Portfolios Based on C14 Countries
T3 12.50 14.15 7.94 12.73 11.39 18.18 8.30
[1.59] [1.58] [1.14] [1.60] [1.42] [0.82] [0.82]
T1 4.50 3.96 5.42 3.48 6.61 5.34 3.39
[0.75] [0.47] [1.10] [0.56] [0.95] [0.82] [0.41]
Spread (T3-T1) 8.00 *** 10.19 *** 2.52 9.25 ** 4.78 12.84 *** 4.91





  TANGIBILITY OF 




Default Risk Portfolios’ Factor Loadings 
 
 
This figure presents the market, size (SMB), value (HML) and momentum (MOM) factor loadings (betas) of 
value-weighted portfolios sorted on the basis of the out-of-sample (OOS) Campbell et al. (2008, CHS) de-
fault risk estimates. These betas are estimated from full-sample regressions of each excess portfolio return on 
the excess market return and the SMB, HML and MOM factor returns according to the four-factor Fama-
French-Carhart (FFC) asset pricing model. The sample period is 2000-2014. Factor loadings are presented for 
portfolios of stocks from the C6 countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the U.K.) and the 
C14 countries (the C6 countries plus Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
and Taiwan). To estimate OOS CHS default risk estimates, a LOGIT model is recursively run for each of the 
C6 countries; see Section 3 and the caption of Table 5. For the countries that feature too few bankruptcies, 





































Profitability of Default Risk Spread Strategies 
 
 
This figure shows the profitability of distress risk spread strategies that are long the decile portfolio with the 
highest default risk stocks (P10) and short the decile portfolio with the lowest default risk stocks (P1), as 
classified on the basis of the Campbell et al. (2008, CHS) default risk estimates. We use as a portfolio sorting 
variable out-of-sample (OOS) CHS default risk values, estimated recursively using LOGIT models, as de-
scribed in the caption of Table 5, and the examined period is 2000-2014. Portfolios P10 and P1 are formed at 
the end of each December of year t-1 and they are held from February of year t to January of year t+1, at 
which point they are rebalanced. Returns are calculated in U.S. dollar terms and they are reported for both 
value-weighted (vw) and equally-weighted (ew) portfolios. Results are reported for the C6 countries (Aus-
tralia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the U.K.) and the C14 countries (the C6 countries plus Denmark, 
Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Taiwan). The shaded areas in the graphs 
indicate OECD-defined recession periods, where the light grey indicates that 4-8 of our sample countries are 
in a recession, the moderately dark grey that 8-12 are in a recession, and the dark grey that more than 12 are 

























Profitability Distress Strategy - OOS
C6-vw C6-ew C14-vw C14-ew
